The Newness of New Technology by Price, Monroe
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (ASC) Annenberg School for Communication
January 2001
The Newness of New Technology
Monroe Price
University of Pennsylvania, Mprice@asc.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers
NOTE: At the time of publication, author Monroe Price was affiliated with the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
Currently(February, 2008), he is an Adjunct Full Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/56
For more information, please contact libraryrepository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Price, M. (2001). The Newness of New Technology. Cardozo Law Review, 22 (5-6), 1885-1913. Retrieved from
http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/56
The Newness of New Technology
Abstract
Every new technology transforms the world around it. A century ago, in a gentle preface to his novel Under
the Greenwood Tree Thomas Hardy wrote of the transformation of little church orchestras in village England.
Humble and amateur community instrumentalists were being displaced by an "isolated organist" employing a
newly manufactured and more cheaply distributed technology, the harmonium or barrel organ. The new
device presented certain advantages in control and accomplishment, but, he suggested, the change caused the
stultification of the clergy's aims and resulted in loss of interest among parishioners. In these tiny hamlets the
technology of musical development had consequences for participation, organization of the institution, the
nature of the music that was played, and, Hardy seemed to be saying, for country life as well. Of these multiple
and small transformations major changes in society take place.
Comments
NOTE: At the time of publication, author Monroe Price was affiliated with the Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law, Yeshiva University. Currently(February, 2008), he is an Adjunct Full Professor at the Annenberg
School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/56
HeinOnline -- 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1885 2000-2001
THE NEWNESS OF NEW TECHNOLOGY
Monroe E. Price*
Every new technology transforms the world around it. A
century ago, in a gentle preface to his novel Under the Greenwood
Tree/ Thomas Hardy wrote of the transformation of little church
orchestras in village England. Humble and amateur community
instrumentalists were being displaced by an "isolated organist"
employing a newly manufactured and more cheaply distributed
technology, the harmonium or barrel organ. The new device
presented certain advantages in control and accomplishment, but,
he suggested, the change caused the stultification of the clergy's
aims and resulted in loss of interest among parishioners. In these
tiny hamlets the technology of musical development had
consequences for participation, organization of the institution, the
nature of the music that was played, and, Hardy seemed to be
saying, for country life as well. Of these multiple and small
transformations major changes in society take place.
Newness, a preoccupation with the unknown, a twinning of
heralded benefits and fears of danger is one trope of restructuring
that is evident throughout the process of legal and policy
transformation. Every candidate for new information technology
has invited a super-heated rhetoric of millennial social change, a
balloon of Hardy's modest and precise description of the effect of
the harmonium. When wireless radio technology was introduced
in the first decades of the twentieth century, world peace was said
to be only a turn of the dial away.2 The New York Times wrote:
"Nothing so fosters and promotes a mutual understanding and a
community of sentiment and interests as cheap, speedy, and
,. Sadie and Joseph Dancyger Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva
University and co-director, Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy, University of
Oxford, LLB Yale Law School, 1964. This Essay is adapted from a forthcoming book
tentatively titled Journeys in Media Space: Law, Identity and Technology in a Global
Environment. I presented this paper at the Institute for Advanced Study (information
technology and society group) in fall 2000 as a Member in the School of Social Science.
1 THOMAS HARDY, UNDER THE GREENWOOD TREE (Tim Dolin ed., Penguin
Putnam 1999) (1872).
2 See Susan J. Douglas, Amateur Operators and American Broadcasting: Shaping the
Future of Radio, in IMAGINING TOMORROW: HISTORY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE
AMERICAN fuTURE 35 (Joseph J. Corn ed., 1986).
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convenient communication."3 Promised riches by hawkers of the
new technology, investors poured enormous amounts of money
into fledgling, often nearly bankrupt, wireless companies. As a
guide to restructuring, newness in information technologies is
almost always packaged with a stated capability for fulfilling
dreams and, simultaneously, challenging existing institutions and
mores.
It is possible that the satellite, the Internet, and other
information technologies will lead to the greatest revolution in
information since the invention of the printing press.4 The extent
to which this will be the case is not the point of this Article.
Rather, it is to ask how change in technology is conceptualized,
evaluated, and manifested in the process of reshaping institutions
and laws. Governments try to divine how the newness of
information technology affects the porousness of boundaries,
capacities of old institutions to regulate new realities, the cultural
horizons that result from altered patterns of data and image flows.
Then, based on inadequate information, states probe ways to
manage what they think are the consequences.
Elsewhere, I have explored examples of the threat of the new:
its articulation as a carrier of illegal and harmful content and the
capacity of new information technologies to present or intensify
potential mischief and dangers.s Legislation to reshape modes of
access and surveillance can be seen as an effort to deflect the use
of new media for such purposes. In 1996, President Clinton
established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection to investigate the potential for terrorism on the Internet
and legislation ensued from that.6 A President's Working Group
on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet called for restrictions on
anonymity in cyberspace, citing law enforcement's inability to
trace online fraud, hacking, and trafficking in child pornography,
firearms, and drugs.7 A· society that fears revolutionary,
3 Id. at 39 (quoting N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1899, at 6).
4 See Jonathan Wallace & Michael Green, Bridging the Analogy Gap: The Internet, the
Printing Press and Freedom of Speech, 20 SEAITLE U. L. REV. 711 (1997); Michael
Hauben, The Expanding Commonwealth of Learning: Printing and the Net, in NETIZENS:
ON THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF USENET AND THE INTERNET (1994), at
http://www.columbia.edu/-rh120/ch106.x16 (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
5 THE V-CHIP DEBATE: CONTENT FILTERING FROM TELEVISION TO THE INTERNET
xiv (Monroe E. Price ed., 1998).
6 See CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ASSURANCE OFFICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WHITE
PAPER: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63 (1998); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING
AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURE (1997). The Commission's website may be found at
http://www.pccip.ncr.gov.
7 See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDUCT ON THE INTERNET,
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destabilizing, and dangerous dissent is prepared to vest in its
government extended powers to defend the status quo. Terrorism
or radicalism of dissent becomes another trope that justifies
greater state authority.8
Another quality of newness is how we describe the social
organization by which information comes from those who
originate content to those who consume it. New media technology
famously disintermediates, or is said to, altering the power of
traditional entities' such as department stores, political parties, and
television networks.9 Policymakers who hope for a technology that
destroys existing mediators-creating a freer path between
consumer and producer of information-might be more tolerant of
implementing problems than those who think that the new
technology merely remediates (yielding different institutional
arrangements in place of the old). Legislative and judicial
doctrines often build on a static concept of mediators or
gatekeepers, dependent on actors who can be held responsible. 1O
Media technologies, as they are implemented, scotch the
snake of power but do not destroy it. The language of
technological determinism, as a descriptor of what constitutes the
new, is overblown in this regard. Of course it is true that states
will lose some capacity for control as a result of the spread of
communications technologies. There is no reason to privilege the
existing arrangements of states and the distribution of power
among them. Some states, however, will increase their capacity to
monitor and control as a result of their means of marshalling the
new technology.' And there will be other, as yet unknown, shifts as
wellY States where information is produced may gain power over
states where information is consumed. It may be a hallmark of
increased power to be a state where information is processed or
uplinked to satellite. Power may come from control over vital
elements of the hardware, such as the capacity to build microchips,
THE ELEC. FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING USE OF
THE INTERNET (2000).
8 See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND
THE ENDANGERMENT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (PCCIP) (1998), available at
http://www.epic.orglsecurity/infowar/cip.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,2001).
9 See Charles Firestone, Digital Culture and Civil Society: A New Role for
Intermediaries?, INTERMEDIA, 22 no.6 (Dec.-Jan. 1994-95); see also Symposium, Financial
Services: Security, Privacy, and Encryption, 3 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 4 (1997) (comments
of Valerie McNevin noting the Internet's potential to disintermediate financial services).
10 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1653 (1998).
11 See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired
Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997).
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or control of software, as in encryption or filtering. States gain
money and power when industries-gaming, pornography, or
adventurous sale of pharmaceuticals-for various reasons, though
often taking advantage of technology that allows new zones of
immunity, relocate or establish themselves under the state's
jurisdiction.
Throughout the global debate over new forms of producing
and distributing information, the consistent and haunting question
is whether technology overwhelms law and the capacity of a state
to regulate. It is hardly ever that easy. New technology changes
the frame for negotiation, for making decisions and for the
formation and application of policy. It is much less the case that
technological change eliminates either the need for law or reduces
the capacity for establishing and enforcing norms to nothingness.
What occurs, almost always, is a process of adjustment: norms and
institutions that were created for one set of technologies adjust or
erode. Where basic values and social needs are at stake,
alternative modes of governance and standards emerge.
At the outset, th~ transformation appears radical. An entire
construct seems dependent on an old form of industrial
organization and assumptions about the structure of the media.
Or even if that is not the case, then the capacity of the governing
authority to enforce is, itself, dependent on assumptions that are in
the process of being undermined. But even before the question of
possibility arises, there is the issue of whether a technology is
"new" in the sense that it calls for such a law-transformative
moment. We need to be able to tell when a technological advance
allows us to address a traditional problem in a new fashion, and,
increasingly, we search for ways to maintain (or appear to
maintain) traditional customs notwithstanding the introduction of
technological change.
It is, however, popular to question the capacity of the state to
engage in lawmaking and law enforcement, especially as
technology advances and the implications of the Internet stagger
the statist imagination. Jack Goldsmith has challenged those who
ridicule the possibility of law:
The skeptics make three basic errors. First, they overstate the
differences between cyberspace transactions and other
transnational transactions. Both involve people in real space in
one territorial jurisdiction transacting with people in real space
in another territorial jurisdiction in a way that sometimes causes
real-world harms. In both contexts, the state in which the
harms are suffered has a legitimate interest in regulating the
activity that produces the harms. Second, the skeptics do not
attend to the distinction between default laws and mandatory
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laws. Their ultimate normative claim that cyberspace should be
self-regulated makes sense with respect to default laws that, by
definition, private parties can modify to fit their needs. It
makes much less sense with respect to mandatory or regulatory
laws that, for paternalistic reasons or in order to protect third
parties, place limits on private legal ordering. Third, the
skeptics underestimate the potential of traditional legal tools
and technology to resolve the multijurisdictional regulatory
problems implicated by cyberspace. Cyberspace transactions
do not inherently warrant any more deference by national
regulators, and are not significantly less resistant to the tools of
conflict of laws, than other transnational transactionsY
Newness, then, has many faces; it can be newness within
technology (as in the design of the interface or shifts in control
over computational processes). Newness can be found in the
impact on altering notions of distance or altering the speed of
processes that in a slower environment could not be accomplished.
Newness can mean altered institutional arrangements, as when
states lose power or intermediating institutions lose force.
Newness can have epistemological consequences, as when
technology changes a person's idea of self or of collectivity and
when it challenges existing ethical norms. We could speak of
newness if technology brought to bear new narratives, new
apocalyptic stories, and new ideas of perfection or immortality.
The newness of new technology can be measured by whether its
introduction alters, profoundly, human behavior. These broader
senses of the new. are important even as we turn to the narrow
sense of introduction of technology that is the focus here.
I. CAUTION AND PATIENCE
To look at this trope of newness in depth, I focus on a single
judicial decision where a court was obliged to integrate new media
technologies into its existing patterns of thinking. The opinions in
the 1997 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Reno v.
ACLU,13 taken together with opinions in related cases, furnish a
bouquet of opportunities for understanding. In their opinions, the
Justices see themselves as obliged to determine whether a new
technology is such a departure from what has gone before that it
demands new forms of conceptualization. The Justices also
explore how to ride change-to make and define law while the
technology to be regulated is still indeterminate and there is
12 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,1200-01 (1998).
13 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Other related cases include United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) and Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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insufficient experience or knowledge to understand its actual
impact and consequences. Examining this one example-in which
the United States assessed the regulatory framework for the
Internet so as to control indecency-has its analytic perils. Each
society has its own distinct pattern of determining whether
innovation in media technologies requires altered policies.
Different societies have different mechanisms for rendering this
judgment just as different societies have varied grids for
determining which variables are significant. And in the United
States, more than in many other countries, judges are instrumental
in the defining process.
In the U.S. debate over media technologies and indecency,
there is a specific rhetoric (not replicated in Europe) relating to
the distinction between old media and new. As a consequence of
constitutional tradition and judicial interpretation, every "new"
media technology has to be dissected to see the way it functions
measured against the template of the First Amendment,14 One
question often asked is, does the newness of the medium
differentiate it from, or make it similar to, newspapers,
broadcasting, or cable? By so assessing the characteristics of the
technology (and its surrounding social arrangements), its newness
is tested to determine what features call forth doctrinal
differences. This includes asking whether or how a technology can
be "zoned," establishing specific geographical or time areas for
one form of programming or another. It also includes questions
about whether the technology, coupled with the structure of
distribution, renders the images on the screen more "invasive," or,
rather, more subject to informed choice and selection.
The technology models for the Internet in the 1996
Communications Decency Act ("CDA") are the telephone as well
as radio and television.IS However, the Internet poses no obvious
opportunity, as radio and television familiarly do, to establish parts
of the program day, safe parts and "freer" parts, watersheds or so-
called safe harbors for protecting children from inappropriate
content. Such devices, familiar from European practice and earlier
efforts in the United States, divide the schedule into spans when
indecent programming can be broadcast for adults under the
somewhat old-fashioned assumption that children would not be so
predominantly in the audience. Given global access, this approach
14 This process is superbly described in Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech,
81 CAL. L. REV. 1103 (1993).
IS For an excellent discussion of questions concerning the constitutionality of
regulations protecting children as discussed in Reno, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. Cr. REV. 141 (1998).
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would not work for the Internet. The architecture of the Net
precludes the comforting notion that society can protect itself by
having family viewing times, or times of lower brutality and reduced
sexual programming. The new qualities of the Internet (its global
quality) require constraints that do not distinguish by time period.
On this score, much of the CDA is patterned after existing
legislation prohibiting harassing calls on the telephone.16
A significant issue, in the U.S. framing of the question, was
whether anything new or different occurs with the interaction of
child and image on the screen in the newer technology as opposed to
older technologies. Could it be the case, for example, that for all the
complexity of distribution, for all the newness of new technology,
there is little basis for distinguishing between what a minor saw on a
computer screen and what he or she saw on a television screen?l?
The psychological or cultural implications could be roughly the
same. Qualities of technological newness might not be sufficient to
change the standard of what should be permitted or banned from
what had been present in legislative treatment of other similarly
received images.
It was in the context of this conflict between the old and
continuous or new and differentiated that the CDA came to the
United States Supreme Court. Assessing newness requires
knowledge of context, but the Court made remarkably clear that too
little is reliably known about the behavioral assumptions or
legislative rationale concerning the Internet to determine how to
conceptualize the new technology. In afootnote to his opinion for
the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens sternly points out that no
hearings were held in the Congress on the provisions at issue in the
case until after their passage. He quotes at length one senator's
dismay at Congress's "willy-nilly" intervention in the Internet.18
Justice Stevens concludes his opinion by driving home the Court's
dissatisfaction with "the absence of any detailed findings by the
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the
CDA."19
The Court thus found it difficult to rule decisively; its efforts
were like a powerful automobile moving in a confusing dusk, forced
to do something, but not necessarily in custody of all the relevant
information. The Justices had to assess the nature of newness at a
16 See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New
Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899 (1998).
17 As it happens, the post-1996 technology meant that individuals would often view the
Internet on their television screens, received through their cable.
18 Reno, 521 U.S. at 858 n.24 (1997) (quoting Senator Leahy).
19 [d. at 879.
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time when the potential for change was great, but not yet realized, or
even if realized did not exist in a manner that had an institutional
filter. The Court was asked to furnish constitutional standards to
guide Congress, but the governmental mechanisms for clarifying
basic assumptions were still unclear. Fervent was the wish, among
many in the technology world, for a recognition that the Internet was
new in such a radical way as to call for a totally new jurisprudence
that was wholly liberating. The forces for the new sought a ruling
that would sweepingly defend the Internet from the hands of those
inclined to regulate. Though the Court struck down the CDA, an
impulse to the categorically new was deflected by the ordinary
notion of deference, or perhaps of deferral, to the legislative branch
and to the pull of the constitutionally familiar.
Because these decisions came before a judicial tribunal, one
with limited expertise in media effects (though often called upon to
make assumptions about such effects), one way to read the Court's
decision in Reno may be in terms of the rhythm of decision making.
The proper rhythm or pace can be formulated by asking when, or
under what circumstances, is it appropriate to evaluate the
implications of a technology. The provocative writings of Lawrence
Lessig, especially his views on postponement and readiness, have
addressed this issue. Two articles, The Path of Cyberlaw, and
Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, both written before Reno,
proved unusually influential in this then-young constitutional field.20
Several ideas basic to Lessig's scholarship seem to haunt the Justices'
opinions. One is a plea for caution before policymakers impose a
standard decision-making grid on the use of new technologies.
Professor Lessig states, "if we had to decide today ... just what the
First Amendment should mean in cyberspace, ... we would get it
fundamentally wrong."21
In a second suggestion, Lessig cautions that one must be careful
not to be swept away by metaphors from the physical world when
thinking about cyberspace.22 Constitutional doctrine adapted from
our preexisting environment may not be fully suitable in the brave,
new context,23 Circumstances, facts, and technologies change.
20 Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743 (1995) [hereinafter
Lessig, Cyberlaw]; Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY
L.J. 869 (1996) [hereinafter Lessig, Reading the Constitution].
21 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 777 (1996)
(Souter J., concurring) (quoting Lessig, Cyberlaw, supra note 20, at 1745).
22 See Lessig, Reading the Constitution, supra note 20, at 886. This idea is a source for
Justice O'Connor in Reno, 521 U.S. at 889 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Lessig, Reading the Constitution, supra note 20, at 886).
23 See Lessig, Reading the Constitution, supra note 20, at 902-03 ("We come from a
tradition of translation in constitutional interpretation; in a wide range of cases, the aim
has been to preserve founding values as interpretive contexts have changed. . .. But
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Existing conceptualizations (often based on metaphor) arise and
may be necessary for day-to-day life. But transfer of category may
be the mind's lazy approach to analysis. Taken together, these
cautionary ideas suggest that the Court (or a court), muddling
through, must wait and see before it prescribes solutions.24
Indeed these notions have transcending and complex
implications not only for jurisprudence in the Internet era but for all
decisionmakers dealing with new media technologies. The idea that
doctrine turns on timing means that there are moments in which
insecurity about power ought to lead to its nonexercise or to a fuzzy
outcome. Yet that conflicts with strongly held views about how
constitutional determinations ought to be articulated by an entity
like the Supreme Court consistent with obligations to communicate
clearly and decisively to the public, the Congress, and other judicial
tribunals.
Doubt and caution may be reasons for the Supreme Court not
to take a case, but once taken, it is hard to accept the notion of the
Court saying "we don't know yet, but here's the best we can say."
When the plurality in Denver.. Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,25 a First Amendment
case from the cable television medium, came close to saying just that,
Justice Kennedy responded angrily in dissent:
This is why comparisons and analogies to other areas of our
First Amendment case law become a responsibility, rather than
the luxury the plurality considers them to be. The comparisons
provide discipline to the Court and guidance for others, and
give clear content to our standards-all the things I find missing
in the plurality's opinion. . .. We have before us an urgent
claim for relief against content-based discrimination, not a dry
run.26
Furthermore, a position of doubt can conflict, as occurred in Reno,
with an extraordinary pressure to categorize the new technology,
now, as a technology of freedom, unhinged from the ambivalent and
government-justifying history of the regulation of broadcasting. The
publishing industry, library associations, colleges and universities-
an enormously impressive list of plaintiffs-urged (unsuccessfully
translations in cyberspace will not always be clear.").
24 See Lessig, Cyberlaw, supra note 20, at 1754. Lessig states:
Cyberspace is elsewhere, and before carving the First Amendment into
its silicon, we should give the culture a chance to understand it. . .. If
there is sanction to intervene, then it is simply to assure that the
revolution continue, not to assure that every step conforms with the
First Amendment as now understood.
Id.
25 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
26 Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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on this narrow ground) that certainty was necessary and that the
proclivity to regulate by Congress should be nipped in the bud by a
clear decision applying the greatest possible protection to Internet
communications. As the Court states in a different context, "liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. ''27
The second important Reno-related contribution of Professor
Lessig-his articulation of a tentativeness about facts and about how
to capture and reduce the array of facts available-tends to the
poetic. His arguments suggest how complicated it is to adapt the
metaphors and analogies that have influenced the constitutional
doctrine of the physical world to the world of cyberspace,
particularly when that world is itself still being constructed, both
physically and conceptually.28 Time may be necessary to transcend
metaphor. This, then, is a further challenge: to acknowledge that
many legal systems depend on metaphors that are fragile and limited
and that misportray evolving circumstances. Implicit in this
suggestion is a critique of the standard process of extending law,
suggesting that shifting to cyberspace from more physical
counterparts requires a rethinking of how categories are established,
and who determines the character of the real world (in the U.S. case,
the respective role of Congress, administrative agencies, and the
courts).
The opinion of Justice O'Connor in Reno illustrates the
problem of adjusting to metaphors while assessing a new
technology. She relates a wish to think of the Internet as a land,
inhabited by a number of institutions, some of whom are
purveyors of indecent material. For her, the relevant ways of
thinking about the law are to consider the applicability of legal
analogies. In her opinion she looks, especially, toward decisions
concerning the more physical world of bookstores and their
locations. There, the Court has endorsed the establishment of
"adult zones," specified physical sites that deal in pornographic
materials and that can be segregated to particular parts of towns
and cities, thus removed from children. By relying on the notion
that this is a "zoning case"29-which is itself a vision of
cyberspace-she makes her own leap, coping with the new but well
within existing modes of fashioning principles. 3O
27 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,844 (1992).
28 See Lessig, Cyberlaw, supra note 20, at 1753 ("[N]o court should purport to decide
these questions finally or even firmly. Here especially should be the beginning of a
dialogue, which perhaps more than others is meant to construct its subject more than
reflect it. ").
29 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 886 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
30 See Lessig, Reading the Constitution, supra note 20, at 886-95.
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But Justice O'Connor demonstrates that she cannot be sure the
analogy would work. Is zoning in cyberspace the same as zoning in
the physical world? Justice O'Connor expresses doubts whether the
received doctrine respecting speech-related zoning-rules that she
finds acceptable in their traditional application to street corners in
cities-should apply in cyberspace.3! The image of the adult
bookshop, with its masked windows, the forbidden entry, the lonely
monitor working into the night, translates into cyberspace only with
difficulty. "Before today," Justice O'Connor writes, there was no
reason to question the approach of zoning, for before the Internet
case "the Court has previously only considered law that operated in
the physical world, a world with two characteristics that make it
possible to create 'adult zones': geography and identity."32 This new
layer of abstraction is what forces the rethinking of the Constitution
and basic principles in the world of cyberspace.33 Thus, Justice
O'Connor retains her commitment to the architecture of her past
constitutional doctrine, but recognizes the complexity of extending it
to the new technologies.
How does a decision maker act in such a moment of
indecision-a moment when it is unclear whether the judicially
accepted verities of a physical world exist in the cyberspace
counterpart? Justice O'Connor concludes,
Although the prospects for the eventual zoning of the Internet
appear promising, I agree with the Court that we must evaluate
the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the Internet as
it exists today. Given the present state of cyberspace ... the
[statute's] 'display' provision could not pass muster.34
However, she justifies her belief that it will pass eventually by
saying, "Cyberspace is malleable. Thus, it is possible to construct
barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity, making
cyberspace more like the physical world and, consequently, more
amenable to zoning laws. This transformation of cyberspace is
already underway."35
II. ASSESSING NEW TECHNOLOGY
To determine the· newness of a media technology one must
have a description of it, fixing the points for a factual assessment.
To achieve such a description involves notions of relevance. It
may be important, for example, that new satellite dish technology
3! See Reno, 521 U.S. at 888-91.
32 Id. at 889.
33 See Lessig, Reading the Constitution, supra note 20, at 885-88.
34 Reno, 521 U.S. at 891 (citation omitted).
35 Id. at 890.
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is handkerchief-sized, but the relevant question is whether a
reduction of diameter has legal and constitutional consequences.
In societies where the state seeks to monitor or control the viewing
habits of its citizens, the largeness or smallness of satellite dishes
may be of great significance. What makes a new technology new
for purposes of legal or constitutional analysis may often be a
matter of the extent to which the new technology threatens,
sustains, or even enhances a particular state's position in the
marketplace for loyalties.36 In this respect, the concept of
technological newness may function as cover for very traditional
state concerns. What is new in a new technology may simply be
those aspects of the technology that challenge state control or
render current legal doctrine untenable.
Assembling facts to evaluate which attributes of significance
have become realized or are likely to exist within a period relevant
to a societal decision is central, then, to the project of deciding
what is paradigm-shifting about a technology. Almost by
definition, however, newness is often a series of claims, a series of
promises, and a series of hopes. The questions of changing
constitutionality or paradigm-shift arise during times of aspiration,
before industry structure and performance in the world are fully
realized. The potential for stalemate is obvious. Financial
investment in the industry may not be maximized until a reliable
. legal environment is established, yet the decisions concerning
norms cannot take place until there is sufficient information.
Let us turn to Reno again for an example of the relevance of a
factual base. One background issue of significance was whether
circumstances existed that allowed parents easily to control what
their children saw on the Internet.37 Danger to children, after all,
was the big fear (justified or not) motivating Congress, the dark
omen confounding the Internet's benefits. The CDA put the onus
of keeping the Internet clean largely on the senders of
information. Providers or senders had to ensure, more or less, that
only material "not indecent" flowed through the wires if young
people would have access to it. Online providers were immune
from responsibility only if they took specifically designated steps
to assure that the recipient was not a minor. However, because of
the shape of American· First Amendment jurisprudence, this
congressional approach would not be constitutional if less
36 See Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global
Competition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667 (1994).
37 For a full discussion of these questions, see Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment's
Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content
Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1117 (2000).
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restrictive alternatives were available to meet the legitimate goals
of Congress.
Thus, in the Reno litigation, one of the major questions was
whether or not such solutions-less restrictive alternatives that
would allow speakers to be unfettered (or less fettered)-are truly
available. One of the revolutionary ways of thinking about
"alternatives" was technology similar to the V-chip, software-
filtering systems that would allow screening by the user, rather
than restrictions on the sender.38 But a determination that a
technology provides a "less restrictive alternative" is necessarily
based on an assumption that the technology actually exists (or is
very likely to exist). The evaluation of which alternatives are
viable or restrictive are questions concerning what the world is
really like. Justices must determine what the world of technology
and behavior can do or reliably promises to do at the moment in
question and how to integrate a desired or imagined future into
current constitutional doctrine.
In Reno, Justice Stevens, desirous of invalidating the burdens
Congress imposed on the senders of information, had to stretch to
make his point on the utility of alternatives. Outlining the
anticipated types of devices available through the Internet, he
writes, in carefully chosen words:
Systems have been developed to help parents control the
material that may be available ... , A system may either limit a
computer's access to an approved list of sources that have been
identified as containing no adult material, it may block
designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt to block
messages containing identifiable objectionable features.39
Justice Stevens notes that current technologies include parental
control software that can screen for suggestive words or for known
sexually explicit sites, though there is no software that can screen
for sexually explicit images.4o
The passive voice suggests the distance Justice Stevens places
between his convictions and the description of reality that he
presses into service. He also employs a device available to
reviewing courts like the Supreme Court. On a "matter of fact"
(like whether these devices are available), a Justice of the Supreme
Court can rely on the trial court as a "finder of fact." Here, the
38 For a review of these issues in advance of the Supreme Court's 2000 decision in
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000), see the perceptive
student Note by Barton Beebe, Parental Initiative in the Age of Signal Bleed, 109 YALE
LJ. 627 (1999).
39 Reno, 521 U.S. at 854-55.
40 See id. (relying on finding 72 of the trial court, citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp.
824,842 (E.D.Pa. 1996)).
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District Court had, according to Justice Stevens, determined from
the evidence that "a reasonably effective method by which parents
can prevent their children from accessing material which parents
believe is inappropriate will soon be widely available."41 Note that
the method is not yet available, and the "evidence" is probably a
self-serving declaration by those who hope to introduce such
software that it will be available.42
This technological meliorism has been criticized. One year
after the Court handed down Reno, Professor Lessig published an
influential law review article, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA
2.0 vs. Filtering.43 In the article, he warns that even if the less
restrictive means relied on by the Court became available in the
form of effective filtering software, this technology would be more
intrusive on speech than the provisions rejected in Reno. He
states,
My sense is that this first major victory-in Reno v. ACLU-has
set us in a direction that we will later regret .... The "less
restrictive means" touted by free speech activists in Reno are, in
my view, far more restrictive of free speech interests than a
properly crafted CDA would be. And unless we quickly shift
ground, we will see Congress embracing these less protective
(of speech) means, or worse, we will see the success of the
President in bullying industry into accepting them.44
Professor Eugene Volokh was also dissatisfied with the
reasoning.45 In his view, the most troubling aspect of Justice
Stevens's opinion was the statement that the CDA's burden on
free speech "is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would
be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the
statute was enacted to serve."46 The important phrase, to Volokh,
is "at least as effective."47 To him, no alternative could reach this
standard. "None of the Court's proposed alternatives to the
CDA-or any other alternatives I can imagine-would have been
41 Reno, 521 U.S. at 846 (emphases omitted).
42 The Court also made much of the fact that "existing technology did not include any
effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications
on the Internet without also denying access to adults." [d. at 876. In contrast, "[d]espite its
limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective
method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other
material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely
available." [d. at 877.
43 Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998).
44 [d. at 632.
45 See Volokh, supra note 15.
46 [d. at 148 (quoting Reno, 521 U.S. at 874).
47 [d. at 148-60.
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as effective as the CDA's more or less total ban."48 Volokh
continues, "The pregnant negative in the Court's reasoning is that,
had there really been no equally effective alternatives (as in fact
there are not), the CDA should have been upheld."49
There are a few other areas, lurking in Reno, where decision
makers have to decide what dignity to accord to those things that
pass as "facts." What assumptions, for example, exist about the
nature and functioning of the family that inform evaluations of the
role of new technology? Since so much of the social concern over
the Internet seems to be about the child, and so many of the
remedies deal with interactions between that child and his or her
family, one would think the empirical grounding for difficult
decisions would be abundant, even if not wholly adequate.
There are normative questions such as whether a parent ought
to be able to determine that his or her child should watch images
that the state considers inappropriate. But there are factual
questions that underlie proposals for change. Are filters useful?
How do parents influence the viewing habits of children? In Reno,
Justice Stevens visits, glancingly, the issue of whether Congress can
protect children from indecent programming regardless of the
desire of their parents. The United States, in its argument, had
contended that the First Amendment does not preclude "a blanket
prohibition on all 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' messages
communicated" to a minor "regardless of parental approval."50
The Court demurred, but in doing so, it seemed to raise a new kind
of test. It is true, Justice Stevens writes, that protection of children
is a "compelling interest" that, in some instances, justifies
regulation. But a regulation that potentially overrules parental
preferences, or even covers parental speech to children, "imposes
an especially heavy burden" on Congress to demonstrate why less
restrictive provisions would not be suitableY
This "parent-protecting" test and the context in which this
debate arises is intriguing. For just as moralistic as Congress (and
perhaps the Court) seems to be in terms of limiting the access of
children to indecent material, it is similarly concerned about
48 [d. at 149.
49 [d. at 157.
50 Reno, 521 U.S. at 878. A dispute, really a skirmish, within this discussion is whether
or not "minor" should include individuals under eighteen or under seventeen years of age.
5! [d. at 879. In dealing with this question, Justice O'Connor concluded that the record
did not show that "many E-mail transmissions from an adult to a minor are conversations
between family members"; but more important, she finds "no support for the legal
proposition that such speech is absolutely immune from regulation." [d. at 896. Perhaps
both the Court and Justice O'Connor agree that such speech is not "absolutely immune,"
since the Court holds that such speech might be regulable if Congress were to meet an
especially heavy burden. [d.
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trenching on parent-child relationships. And this conflict drives
Congress and the Court to make unfounded, sometimes silly, but
almost always sweeping, statements about parents and their
relationship to children. The Court cites earlier decisions for the
"consistent" principle that "the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society."52 This principle rests on the earlier
pronouncement (having to do with foreign-language education)
that, "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care, and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder."53
Having decided that the CDA covers e-mail, Justice Stevens
engaged in an elaborate conceit to indicate the constitutional
infirmity of the legislation. "[M]any e-mail transmissions from an
adult to a minor are conversations between family members," he
says, setting a predicate for their special protection.54 Under the
CDA, Justice Stevens contends, "a parent who sent his 17-year-old
college freshman information on birth control via e-mail could be
incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their
home community found the material 'indecent' or 'patently
offensive,' if the college town's community thought otherwise."55
To be fair, Justice Stevens's concern goes beyond e-mail. It seems
wrong to him that under the CDA, a parent "could face a lengthy
prison term" for "allowing her 17-year-old to use the family
computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, in her
parental judgment, deems appropriate."56
Here again, as with so much in Reno, it is a dependence on a
specific and possible empty understanding of the facts of the world
that virtually controls how the new media technology is judged.
The present state is such that the relationship between conclusions
and available facts is dismal. Take just the vision of what we mean
by "parents," what relationship there is (much less ought to be)
between parents and children, and how, in fact, decisions are made
to deploy sites that are considered "indecent" by Congress. To
make a decision, Justice Stevens must have a mental picture of
how decisions to deploy indecent sites are made so he can tell
whether there is a problem serious enough to warrant
52 Id. at 865 (citation omitted).
53 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1943) (emphasis added) (holding
constitutional a statute barring the teaching of German language in public schools).
54 Reno, 521 U.S. at 865 n.32. But see Reno, 521 U.S. at 886-97 (O'Conner, J.,
dissenting).
55 Id. at 878.
56 Id.
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congressional intervention, and his examples are somewhat class-
biased, to use an old-fashioned term that seems relevant here. The
image that must be in the mind of the lawmaker is of the fractured,
possibly "dysfunctional" family, what the government in its brief
for Denver Area described as the condition of "absence,
distraction, indifference, inertia, or insufficient information" that
besets "innumerable parents" in America.57 A view of the family
that supports intervention includes the imagined nonparent
parent, incapable or unwilling to establish standards, "consenting"
not in the active mode of reviewing and approving material, but
acquiescing in an environment where the imposition of standards
is impossible (for reasons of time, will, or culture).58
Another one of the most interesting debates about the
Internet concerns the utility of national law given the
extraordinarily international and cross-border nature of modern
communications, especially in new media. Justice Stevens's
opinion in Reno is not centrally about this subject, but there is
some passing mention of a possible constitutional test. The issue is
nestled in a footnote, ruminating within the Supreme Court
decision. Justice Stevens cites an argument made by one of the
plaintiffs, the American Library Association, that "[b]ecause so
much sexually explicit content originates overseas," the
Association argued, "the CDA cannot be 'effective."'59 as that
term is precisely used in American jurisprudence. Justice Stevens
fends off the argument, saying that it "raises difficult issues
regarding the intended, as well as the permissible scope of,
extraterritorial application of the CDA."60 This is the Court's first
careful encounter with an issue widely anticipated in legal
literature on the Internet.61 Because the Act could be condemned
57 Respondent's Brief at 37, Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727 (1996) (Nos. 95-124, 95-227).
58 Implicit is the problem, addressed in Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), of
assuring sufficient adult access to speech while also protecting children. How does one tell
what the profile of impact is of a congressional proscription-whether it depletes speech
available to adults while protecting children? Of course, every congressional proscription
or even channeling must have that impact; what constitutes too much, what constitutes
adequate alternative availability of information is a matter that has never been adequately
addressed by the Court, nor has it been clear what factual bases should underlie a
conclusion. See id. (finding that Michigan Penal Code section providing that selling to a
police officer a book found to have a potential effect of corrupting the morals of a youth
violates the Due Process Clause).
59 Reno, 521 U.S. at 878 n,45.
60 [d.
61 See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996). Johnson and Post state:
While these electronic communications play havoc with geographic boundaries,
a new boundary, made up of the screens and passwords that separate the virtual
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on other grounds, the Court suggests, it does not have to deal with
it.
Still, there is much within these few words worthy of
comment. Let us assume that "so much sexually explicit content
originates overseas."62 It is unclear, from this terse discussion, what
it is in the foreign origin of some pornographic material that can
limit Congress's capacity to devise a set of satisfactory statutory
prohibitions for indecent programming that originates in the
United States. Justice Stevens suggests that, perhaps the CDA
was not intended to apply extraterritorially, though it is highly
likely that almost every prohibited set of images or digits passes
through a domestic telecommunications facility.63 Much more
interesting is the question of "effectiveness." A law is not
"effective" if it can only be enforced against domestic violators
and much of the damage, unremediated, will be caused by those
seemingly beyond the law's reach. And here, the argument seems
to be that these "overseas" violators are incapable of being
prosecuted because of the special nature of Internet technology.
Even if Congress had the power to enact legislation that is
extraterritorial in its reach, technology and practicalities would
render such a law ineffective. In a world of incapacity to stop one
source of illegal conduct, focusing on another might be
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.
It is clear why the American Library Association would make
this argument. Its members are among the possible available
defendants to be singled out, though they are small instruments in
a world in which the massive "real" wrongdoers are "overseas"
entrepreneurs, clever commercial pornographers, largely beyond
the nation's enforcement capacity. The Association has been at
the forefront of efforts to fight local regulation of Internet speech,
both as a matter of principle and because, in an irony of the "post-
world from the "real world" of atoms, emerges. This new boundary defines a
distinct Cyberspace that needs and can create its own law and legal institutions.
Territorially based law-makers and law-enforcers find this new environment
deeply threatening.
Id.
62 Even the term "overseas" has a certain charm as an anachronistic way of conceiving
the relationship between space and jurisdiction.
63 Note that both 47 V.S.c.A. § 223(a) and (d) apply to both "interstate and foreign
communications." 47 V.S.c.A. § 223(a), (d) (West Supp. 1991). Justice Stevens also
suggested that there might be questions about the "permissible scope" of extraterritorial
application of the CDA. Reno, 521 U.S. at 878 n.45. Does that mean that Congress could not
make it a crime for a company in France to send an obscene book to an American address,
that only those parts of a stream of action that touched American soil could be subject to
criminal sanctions? See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL.
L. REV. 1 (1996).
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Gutenberg" age, public libraries are often the institutions that are
sued.64
But the argument is extremely suggestive, perhaps disturbing,
in its implications for the limits of law in a digital world and in a
world of increasing cross-border mobility of capital. Law will tend
to be increasingly incapable of perfect enforcement where
transactions and performances can so easily be moved "overseas."
Here, the laws that are putatively discriminatory because of
difficulties of enforcement are disagreeable images, and the
argument could well be made that they should not be sanctioned at
all. In the future, however, an argument based on inherent
discrimination could be far more encompassing, including the
disallowance of laws applying to electronic commercial
transactions and possibly other areas, for example, aspects of
family law, areas where enforcement might be thwarted if
activities were moved offshore.
Could it be that U.S. law becomes "impossible," or difficult,
to enforce because of the structure of the Internet and the
relationship between extraterritorial actors and U.S. users?
Certainly that argument is in the air, and it is one product of the
facially attractive idea of preserving the Internet as a "regulation-
free" zone.65 At any rate, it is not hard to image that the result of
such incapacity or difficulty would be discriminatory enforcement
against "those poor blokes" who, for reasons of lack of
imagination, willpower, or other place-related reasons stayed
within the power of the state.
How to think about these questions is not yet clear. Making
law disappear is one answer, but not necessarily one that seems to
have many institutional proponents or broad public support. In
November 2000, a French court took issue with the question of
practicality of enforcement. It gave Yahoo Inc. three months to
find a technological means to prevent Web surfers in France from
gaining access to some Web pages on its U.S.-based auction site
that featured over 1,200 Nazi-related items. After the deadline,
64 See Nadel, supra note 37. In an important early case dealing with online censorship
in the context of public library access, Mainstream Loudon v. Board of Trustees, 24 F.
Supp.2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998), a public library was forced to discontinue its use of
restrictive Internet screening software. See generally Julia M. Tedjeske, Note, Mainstream
Loudon and Access to Internet Resources in Public Libraries, 60 U. PIIT. L. REV. 1265
(1999). In another closely watched case, Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, No. A086349,
2001 WL 216719 (Cal. Ct. App. March 6, 2001),
http://www.techlawjournal.comlcensor/19990115.htm. a state court refused to force a
public library to abandon its open access policy regarding Internet use.
65 See generally Gary W. Glisson, A Practitioner's Defense of the White Paper, 75 OR.
L. REV. 277 (1996); see also Vikas Arora, Note, The Communications Decency Act:
Congressional Repudiation of the "Right Stuff," 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473 (1997).
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Yahoo would be fined $13,000 for each day it did not comply with
the order. Of course, unlike the invisible pornographic providers,
Yahoo had a French office and, also, could be easily located for
litigation purposes in the United States.
Taxation, copyright, and defamation law are all areas where,
if care is not taken, discrimination may be the consequence of
patterns of capacity of law enforcement. There will be suggestions
that certain prohibitions that have been taken for granted within a
society are no longer available. More likely, it may mean that a
different form of extraterritorial as well as domestic enforcement
pattern must be devised.66 What it certainly means is that, as
Justice Stevens indicated, these are "difficult issues" indeed, and
may sometime come, in a ripe manner, before the Court.
III. BROADCASTING, RADIO, AND FILM REGULATION V.
INTERNET REGULATION
I have sought in this Article to identify several areas where,
using Reno as an example, new media technology is evaluated
according to its relationship to existing constitutional standards.
The Reno case is part of the Supreme Court's ongoing debate over
the qualities in film, traditional television and radio broadcasting,
cable, and the Internet that render their regulation subject to
different degrees or kinds of constitutional scrutiny. In this last
section, I want to examine another facet of the decision: the way
the Court, as revisionist historian, uses its evaluation of new media
technologies to replay and reorganize its justifications for the
treatment of the technology's predecessors. All government
agents are, to some extent, revisionists as they try to understand
the power of the new in the context of the old. How the Court
engages in revision helps us understand what it is about technology
that is emerging as significant-from this constitutional
perspective.
For example, in Reno Justice Stevens asserts a novel reading
of past doctrine, namely, that the "history of extensive government
regulation of the broadcast medium"67 serves, itself, as a "special
justification" for treating one technology (broadcasters) in
66 Does it mean, for example, that even though transmission or display of "obscene"
material might ordinarily be prosecuted under the CDA, even after the Court's decision,
the necessarily discriminatory aspect of such a prosecution (given the putative
invulnerability of massive foreign purveyors) would be a defense? Cf. Lawrence Lessig,
Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996). Invoking Coase, Lessig argues that
"[a] regulation need not be absolutely effective to be sufficiently effective. It need not
raise the cost of the prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that
activity quite substantially." [d. at 1405.
67 Reno, 521 U.S. at 845.
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restrictive ways not applicable to other speakers. In his discussion
he cited, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,68 a case that is so out
of fashion that it had gone virtually unmentioned by the Court for
years. Another precedent, Turner Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,69 is
cited for the novel observation that. scarcity of available
frequencies, where such scarcity existed for an information
technology "at its inception,"70 is a further justification for lower
scrutiny of broadcasting regulation. Justice Stevens also renews a
somewhat controversial ground for justifying regulation and
distinguishing broadcasting from other media, nam~ly .its
"invasive" nature.71
What is interesting about Justice Stevens's citation of Red
Lion is the subtle shift in the meaning that is implied. The
previous standard understanding of Red Lion had been that
broadcasting was more readily subject to regulation because
scarcity of available frequencies made some form of rationing
necessary and that necessity allowed the imposition of public
interest standards. Because it is supposed that it is impossible for
everyone who so wishes to get on the airwaves, government has to
pick and choose. Almost from the beginning this reading of the
First Amendment, this prong of Red Lion, endured attack.72
Economists argue that any scarcity shortage is government-
imposed, in that it was always possible to allocate more spectrum
to broadcasting and technically possible to make spectrum
accommodate more voices. This argument gained emotive power
when cable television and other technologies made channels
plentiful. In a world of abundance, there seems no reason to pitch
constitutional reasoning on a scarcity that, according to some
68 369 U.S. 367 (1969). For a thorough and useful history and discussion of Red Lion,
see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM Of' FREE SPEECH 49 (1993)
(arguing that the scarcity rationale in Red Lion is based on the need to ensure "broad
diversity of views").
69 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1]. The citation of Turner I is unusual. Turner
I, after aU, recites the history of regulatory distinctions only to hold that hjerarchies of
constitutional concern do not encompass both broadcasting and cable television. Turner I was
primarily about the weaknesses of congressional lawmaking. Turner Broadcasting Systems,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner 11], specifically rejected Red Lion's
application of spectrum-scarcity as a ground for regulation in favor of some new "bottleneck"
theory of regulation.
70 Reno, 521 U.S. at 845 (emphasis added).
71 See Sable Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (prohibiting provider of sexually
oriented prerecorded telephone messages from participating in obscene interstate
telephone communications for commercial purposes but enjoining statutory enforcement
applying to indecent messages).
72 See Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal
Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
976 (1997); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Physical Scarcity, Rent Seeking, and the First
Amendment, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1997). . .
HeinOnline -- 22 Cardozo L. Rev. 1906 2000-2001
1906 CARDOZO LAWREVIEW [Vol. 22:1885
versions, simply does not exist.
Over the years, the Court, itself contested its Red Lion-based
justification in a variety of cases suggesting that subsequent
information and emerging technology might one day require
abandonment of the doctrine. Its survival hung by a hair (or a
vote or two). Now, however, after Reno, the justification may
have changed. Now Red Lion seems to stand for the proposition
that the status of broadcasting as a more regulable medium is
historically contingent, rather than solely technologically based. A
medium that has had significant attention from the government
from the outset will be treated differently from one that has not.
Since most media technologies have close relationships to
government in their development-and the Internet is certainly no
exception-this reading of judicial history is important.
The Court could be saying that traditional television and radio
broadcasting meet three conditions, each of which is necessary for
its peculiar susceptibility to regulation. These are: its history of
extensive government regulation, the spectrum scarcity at its
founding, and its special quality of invasiveness. A medium that
does not have all of these qualities cannot be successfully
compared with broadcasting so as to determine the category of
constitutional analysis in which it fits. On the other hand, the
Court could be arguing that these are relevant factors, not an
ensemble of required conditions. Invasiveness alone, a history of
extensive regulation, early shortages of frequencies, or their
equivalents alone (or some combination of them) in this reading
would be sufficient to justify a lower threshold for congressional
regulation. The relevance of these factors to the Internet and to
Justice Stevens's analysis in Reno therefore bears further analysis.
Justice Stevens recreates the jurisprudence of the
broadcasting cases precisely so as to differentiate the historical
electronic media from this new form of using wires and ether. His
very explanation of cyberspace consists of facts designed to fit into
a reinterpretation of the constitutional basis for regulation in
broadcasting. The qualities of broadcasting that permit greater
regulation, according to Justice Stevens, "are not present in
cyberspace. "73
But is Justice Stevens correct, not in terms of his retrospective
interpretation of the broadcasting cases, but in terms of the way he
differentiates broadcasting from cyberspace? The first area for
differentiation is "history." Justice Stevens makes the claim that
broadcasting had a history of extensive regulation while the "vast
73 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
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democratic forums" of the Internet has not been subject to similar
government supervision and regulation.74 In one sense, of course,
this is a false statement. The Internet, as the Court's decision
traces, has a history rooted in federal supervision and largesse. It
is an outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program to
enable computers operated by the military defense contractors and
universities conducting defense-related research to communicate
with one another by redundant channels. The Advance Research
Project Association Network ("ARPANET") is much more firmly
rooted in a history of government involvement than were the early
days of spectrum usage when radio broadcasting was relatively
wild and open.75
Besides, the relationship between the Internet and Congress
can be likened to the relationship between radio and the federal
government at the time of the Radio Conference that led to the
1927 Act. In the early days of radio, as in the 1990s with the
Internet, there was dynamism, ingenuity, and a period of
unregulated innovation. With radio, explosive growth led to
concern (though on different issues), federal study, and eventually
legislation. Despite Justice Stevens's apparent desire, history
cannot begin when the historian wants it to. What has become the
Internet originated with the Pentagon and involved an almost
exclusively federally authorized network. Also, it is hard to
understand how one characterizes a medium by its history when it
is the very nature of that history that is being fashioned. 76
We also know, now that we have Reno, that the Internet is not
invasive. Why? Because the district court told us so, and the
Supreme Court accepts that finding. Justice Stevens concludes,
"the risk of encountering indecent material by accident is
remote."77 This is, as is said, a "constitutional fact."78 Perhaps a
constitutional fact is different from a garden-variety fact. To
conclude, as Stevens does, that the Internet is distinguishable from
broadcasting with respect to invasiveness, is a complicated matter.
74 [d.
75 True, it was ARPANET, not the vast democratic fora of the Internet, that was so
regulated, but in some respects it is the same medium. Cf. Hazlett, supra note 72, at 908.
76 There is something here of Bollinger's interesting, but never fully judicially
embraced, theory that it was possible to regulate some parts of the media so long as there
was at least one unregulated one, like newspapers or the Internet. See Lee C. Bollinger,
Jr., Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the
Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
77 Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
78 See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question,
and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional
Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985).
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"Unlike communications received by radio or television," Justice
Stevens writes, "'the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps
more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child
requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve
material and thereby to use the Internet unattended."'79
First meaningfully formulated in the dial-a-porn case Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, the notion of
"affirmative steps" represents a patina on "invasiveness."
Affirmative steps certainly enable a more accurate analysis of the
emerging "interactive media model" in U.S. telecommunications,
in which most content will be accessed rather than broadcast,
pulled rather than pushed.80 Yet even for current Internet
technology, there are problems with this innovative approach. It is
true, for example, that, at least the first time, a child has to do
more in a more directed and deliberate way, than turn the dial to
get access to some particularly outrageous or erotic material. But
once the place is saved, or "bookmarked," there is very little
functional difference between turning a dial and gaining access to
a website.
Odder still is the supposed distinction between those children
with some "ability to read" and those without the ability.
Invasiveness and uninvitedness may have to do with a child's
sophistication, but in no previous case did this issue turn on actual
literacy or its absence. Who are we talking about: the seventeen-
year-old deemed to be a computer wizard, or the five-year-old who
stumbles onto the satiric-erotic false-Disney program? How does
the society make this decision? Can it? Are these questions about
which we do not know the answer or is the district court finding in
this case sufficient, even against a congressional finding to the
contrary? Where does Justice Stevens arrive at his factual
understanding of a world that is interacting with the computer and
how that world differs from or is similar to the world that interacts
with radio and television? For constitutional analysis to be careful,
we must know how contingent doctrine is on factual
understandings and what constitutes adequate information
supporting a notion of invasiveness or to the contrary.8!
79 Reno, 521 U.S. at 854 (citing finding 89 of the District Court decision in ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,845 (E.D. Pa. 1996».
80 For an early First Amendment analysis of this model, see Jerry Berman & Daniel J.
Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First
Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619 (1995).
8! In Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996), Justice
Breyer relied on only a few books and articles to conclude that cable television was
invasive in the Pacifica sense. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978)
(asserting that the broadcast media is invasive because of its "pervasive presence in the
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The third and most convincing difference between
broadcasting and Internet questions whether spectrum scarcity
exists. It is now almost an article of faith that whatever scarcity
existed in the bad old days of analog spectrum no longer exists. In
Reno, Justice Stevens puts a new and unexamined spin on the
question, asking, for the first time in the Court's treatment of this
subject, whether the Internet is a "'scarce' expressive
commodity."82 He seemed to be inviting a refocus from an older,
economic analysis of spectrum availability to a broader focus on
the element of "expressiveness." Justice Stevens reveled in the
Internet's plenty: "It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost
capacity for communication of all kinds. . .. Through the use of
chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox."83 All the magic elements are there: pamphleteer, town
crier, and soapbox. No wonder this is Justice Stevens's clinching
point before concluding that "our cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be
applied to this medium."84
Yet there are some factors to consider. We are at a stage in
the development of the Internet-perhaps like early radio-where
entry is certainly easy, inexpensive, and nondiscriminatory. But, as
with radio, it was later developments in industrial organization and
government action that made entry more difficult and a broadly
democratic means of becoming a town crier, almost impossible.
Radio spectrum was not really "scarce," though radio spectrum as
an "expressive commodity" may have been. It would be
wonderful if the Internet were to retain its capacity for
expressiveness, as nonscarce as it seems currently to be, but we do
not know yet whether that will be the case or whether the Court's
limitations on congressional action will expand or restrict that
zone. Certainly, the history of radio would have been different if
the Court had held the earliest forays into regulation and licensing
unconstitutional because of the heady, egalitarian patterns of entry
that characterized the time of basement radio transmission and
ease of speaker entry.
The Court's decision also raises interesting questions about
which numbers-what kinds of abundance-are relevant to the
issue of scarcity, or scarcity of "an expressive commodity," to
lives of Americans" and because "it is uniquely accessible" to children). Compare the role
of the district court's fact findings in ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
82 Reno, 521 U.S. at 870.
83 Jd.
84 Jd.
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repeat again Justice Stevens's novel and stunning phrase.85 There
are millions of radio receivers just as there are millions of
computers. Penetration is obviously not the same, but moving in
the same direction of universality. The important point for Justice
Stevens, however, is that computers, unlike radios, are interactive.
What is being compared is access or entry by speakers, not
receivers. The end of scarcity with respect to "expressiveness"
comes precisely because of the radical transformation of access to
conveyor impart as opposed to receive information.
Here the Court is committing to a particular conception of the
Internet. Justice Stevens is assuming that the number of
subscribers to the Internet is equivalent to the number of speakers,
i.e., like the telephone, and that subscribing is a mark of entry as
speaker. At the moment, that may be a valid assumption. But the
structure and custom of usage of the Internet could change. The
behavior in the future might be that, other than for an e-mail
function, ninety-nine percent of subscribers act like passive
receivers or dial turners: selectors at best but never, otherwise, as
communicators. Information may come in packaged channels,
with a market structure dominated by three or four giants. Then
the question might be whether bottlenecks to entry exist, and
whether analysis of the Internet (in terms of congressional power)
should be assimilated to cases that justified regulation not on
spectrum scarcity, but on the difficulty of access by those who
program channels and distribute them over cable.86
In one respect, this hypothetical future of packaged channels
and a market dominated by oligopolistic producers has already
come into existence, and the implications for "scarcity" have
already begun to take shape. The abundance of the Internet has
produced a new form of scarcity, one described by Jack Balkin:
All communications media produce too much information. So
in that sense, all media have a problem of scarcity. But the
scarcity is not a scarcity of bandwidth. It is a scarcity of
audience. There is only so much time for individuals to
assimilate information. And not only is there too much
information, some of it is positively undesirable. As a result, all
media give rise to filtering by their audience, or, more
importantly, by people to whom the audience delegates the task
85 Id. This is interesting because of the history of the "scarcity" rationale and its tie to
limitations on spectrum. This was thought to be a physical limitation, as compared to
shortages of printing presses or limitations on the number of newspaper dailies in a market
that could survive, both of which were considered economic. By shifting the phrase from
spectrum scarcity to scarcity of an expressive commodity, Justice Stevens might be
opening the way for a reconsideration of this long-held distinction.
86 See Turner II, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
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of filtering.87
Information overproduction creates a problem not merely of
unwanted offensiveness greeting an Internet user, but also of
unwanted irrelevance. Portals to the Internet, such as Yahoo or
Excite, exist to remedy this problem. Their home pages form
some of the most expensive "real estate" in cyberspace. These
portals provide free search engine technology to aid the user in
finding desired websites. They also advertise websites. If a
website is not listed by these search engines, it effectively does not
exist. The search portals have become the dominant brokers in
the "expressive commodity" of the Internet.88
Justice Stevens, in Reno, reopens questions of definition,
exploring considerations that make one information technology
more sensitive than another, more susceptible to regulation. He
identifies history, scarcity, and invasiveness as criteria for decision.
But his treatment of broadcasting and the Internet are not
necessarily convincing, even as his own grid of analysis is applied.
This is not surprising. "We are not the first generation," as
Carolyn Marvin has written, "to wonder at the rapid and
extraordinary shifts in the dimension of the world and the human
relationships it contains as a result of new forms of
communication, or be surprised by the changes those shifts
occasion in the regular pattern of our lives."89
Technology has the potential to alter every institution, to
provide even more access to education, to jobs, and to
opportunities.90 But things are new from a particular perspective.
A new technology may be one that replaces or substantially
augments a predecessor or establishes difference of a kind that
must cross a hurdle of significance. We might reserve the notion
87 J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation,
45 DUKE L.J. 1131 (1996).
88 The idea that scarcity no longer exists because of the Internet and various other
technologies of abundance has been challenged by other comparative analysts of media
law and policy. See Stefaan Verhulst, About Scarcities and Intermediaries: The Regulatory
Paradigm Shift of Digital Content Reviewed, in NEW MEDIA HANDBOOK (Leah Lievrouw
& Sonia Livingstone eds., forthcoming 2001). Verhulst proposes that the very abundance
of content has caused a need for new intermediaries that can navigate, contextualize, filter,
decode, customize, and authenticate the information and its source for the user. He states,
a "phenomenon of re-intermediation is emerging, [that] in many ways creates new
(artificial) scarcities." Id. at 32.
89 CAROLYN MARVIN, WHEN OLD TECHNOLOGIES WERE NEW: THINKING ABOUT
ELECTRIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3 (1988); see also
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS IN EUROPE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Maxine Berg
& Kristine Bruland eds., 1998).
90 See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM: How INFINITE BANDWIDTH WILL
REVOLUTIONIZE OUR WORLD (2000); JOEL KOTKIN, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY: How THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION Is RESHAPING THE AMERICAN LANDSCAPE (2000).
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of newness for innovations that have major significance for
cultural developments, the distribution of power in society, the
organization of the polity, or the recognition of new consumer
markets. 91 Altered flows of information, resulting from new
technologies, change in almost every case the balances that
previously existed in a legal framework.92
The point of this Article, as I noted at the outset, is not to take
sides in the grueling debate over whether new information
technologies are truly revolutionary.93 Anthony Smith established a
fairly elevated test for the "newness" of new technology: "An age in
which a new transforming technology is taking hold must, almost
self-evidently, express its most profound social, economic, and
political changes in terms of that technology-so closely and
completely that historians try, but fail, to disentangle the resulting
skeins of cause and effect."94 The task, rather, has been to ask how
these transformations interact with the processes of law-making
and adjudication. As electronic technologies capture our time, our
lives, our imagination, they socially and culturally overwhelm our
older modes of thinking about the legal regulation of data, speech,
imagery. As Ethan Katsh has noted, the new technologies create
"shifts in the value of information, in the language used to describe
information, in customs used to employ information, in
expectations about how information will be used, and in norms
that are applied to information and communication."95 Katsh
likens technology changes to changes in fundamental tools and
hastens to indicate how significant such transitions might be. "The
new media enable us to expand in rather extraordinary ways our
capabilities for processing, storing, organizing, representing, and
communicating information."96 In the early period of the
technology's use, the prevailing attitude might be that all that is
occurring is the development of new methods, techniques to do
existing tasks more efficiently. But in certain circumstances, tools
become virtually autonomous engines for change. Like the
91 For a study of the scope of newness of the printing press, see ELIZABETH
EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1993). The
Rand Corporation established a project, partly based on Eisenstein's model of change, to
look at parallels between the coming of the Internet and the coming of the printing press.
See New Paradigms and Parallels: The Printing Press and the Internet, at
http://www.rand.orglparallels/ (Oct. 2000).
92 See M. Ethan Katsh, Cybertime, Cyberspace, and Cyberlaw, J. ONLINE L. (1995), at
http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/ publications/joUKatsh.html (last visited Jan. 15,2001).
93 See, e.g., GILDER, supra note 90; KOTKIN, supra note 90.
94 ANTHONY SMITH, FROM BOOKS TO BYTES 3 (1993).
95 M. Ethan Katsh, Law Reviews and the Migration to Cyberspace, 29 AKRON L. REV.
115, 120 (1996).
96 Id. at 120.
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process-changing harmonium in Hardy's modest village church, "a
plow may compel its users to arrange their agricultural activity,
and perhaps also other parts of their lives, in a way that conforms
to its own logic" in ways neither intended nor foreseen by those
who originally devised the innovation.97
Law moves more slowly than its external impacts and not
always or immediately in parallel with them. The development of
law is imprisoned in the rhetoric of its prior existence. That is the
weakness, certainly of courts, but of legislatures as well. Altered
flows of information, resulting from new technologies, change the
balances that previously existed in a legal framework. But it is hard
to know when those changes undo the preexisting formulaic
approaches to a task. Reno is an example of striving to move
outside of existing formulae, but still being bound by them, of
pushing at categorical boundaries, but functioning within the
boundaries themselves. Throughout the law, this process of
adjustment takes place. Disputes over the power and effect of
images on children are no different. Something is changing,
changing markedly (as has always been the case) in the interaction
between the staggering symbolic output of the society and the
development of its children. Courts and legislatures try to mediate
this interaction, as happened in the CDA, its descendants and the
court opinions (like Reno) interpreting and evaluating them. In the
flood of novelty captured by the new technology, it is difficult to
determine what attributes of change yield revolutionary
consequences and what attributes merely expedites distribution.
Newness is a quality that fits uneasily with law.
97 PETER L. BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY 9 (1969).
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